Testimony Before the Senate Rules Committee

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Executive Summary

In 2001, the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project estimated that 4-6 million votes were lost owing to administrative problems. These people tried to vote but could not because of difficulties with polling place operations, voting equipment, absentee ballots, or registration. The largest sources of the problem lie evidently in the voter registration system, which accounted for roughly half of all lost votes.

Eight years later, we have witnessed significant improvement in election administration. Updating of voting equipment has cut the rate of residual votes in half. States have put in place provisional balloting and other checks to prevent lost votes. Voter registration, however, remains problematic. State efforts to improve registration in compliance with HAVA are underway, but limited resources might hamper the ability of states and counties to implement fully computerized registration systems.

This testimony examines the experiences of the electorate in 2008 with the voting systems, especially registration and other parts of the authentication process. In 2008, there were approximately 230 million people of voting age, 212 million eligible to vote, 168 million registered, and 133 million who actually voted. These facts demonstrate the pivotal importance of voter registration. Approximately 79 million eligible voters did not participate. Of these, 44 million were not registered, and 35 million registered citizens did not vote. According to data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 4 to 5 million people report administrative procedures as the reason for not registering, and approximately 4 million of registered voters did not vote because of administrative problems, approximately the same magnitude as we saw in 2000. Improving registration and authentication systems ought to remain a high priority.

Introduction

I am Stephen Ansolabehere, Professor of Government at Harvard University and Elting Morison Professor of Political Science at MIT. I served as the co-director of the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project from its inception through 2004. I am on the Board of Overseers of the American National Election Study, the longest running social science research project in the United States, and Principal Investigator of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, a consortium of over 50 research teams that develops large-sample surveys. The CCES conducted sample surveys of 36,000 respondents in 2006 and 33,000 respondents in 2008, aimed partly at gauging voters' experiences on Election Day or in the absentee and early voting process. I also consult with CBS News Election Decision Desk to make projections of winners in state and federal elections. Through these research activities I have had the opportunity to work with a large number election officials and to observe closely the performance of the electoral process in the United States.

In 2001, the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project sought first to measure the extent of problems in the voting systems in the United States and to provide as much information as we could assemble to policy makers at that time. We quickly realized that although voting machine problems certainly affected the ability of Americans to make sure that their preferences were recorded, even bigger problems existed in the voter registration system. We estimated that between 4 and 6 million votes were lost in the 2000 election owing to administration or technology problems, and that problems with

voter registration accounted for about half of that.¹ The problems were not uniformly distributed across the country. Some states showed little evidence of difficulties, while others had problems in many parts of their election systems. Florida was not alone.

Our observations were based on state and county election reports, data provided by the Current Population Surveys Election Supplement, and information provided by county election officials and from state election reform commissions. Our objective over the past 8 years has been to do as much as possible to assist local, state, and federal officials in making decisions about the Our main contribution has been provision of information and expertise in areas ranging from computer security to ballot design to statistical assessment of election performance. One of the central missions of this effort has been the collection of better data on election administration over time so that we can gauge where the systems are improving, where they are having difficulties, and what sorts of practices and laws seem to have worked.

There have been tremendous improvements in voting technology over the past eight years. In 2000, residual votes (the difference between total votes cast and total votes for a given office, and a commonly used measure of voting technology problems) averaged approximately 2 percent. Counties using punch card equipment in 2000 and 2004 averaged the highest residual vote rate. In 2008, after phasing out punch card ballots and lever machines, residual votes averaged less than 1 percent. Were American states still using punch cards, the higher rate of residual votes would translate into an

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¹ Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, Voting: What Is, What Could Be, July, 2001.

additional 1.5 million votes lost.² Upgrading technology led to significant improvements in the recording of votes.

I remain concerned about the voter registration systems in the states. The United States is in the middle of the technology transition, from paper-based registration systems in most local election offices to computerized systems, and from town and county systems to systems that can track voters' moves statewide. There are considerable challenges in making this transition, and registration remains the largest source of problems for voters.

The electoral universe in 2008

Analysis of the voter registration process begins with a few simple facts about the electoral universe. How many people may vote? How many are registered and, therefore, in the system? How many people actually do vote? The numbers for the 2008 election break out as follows:

- 230 million people of voting age in the United States.
- 212 million eligible (citizens, non-felons).
- 168 million registered voters.
- 133 million voters in the 2008 General Election.

In other words, 57% of the voting aged population voted in the 2008 general election. That translated into 62% of the eligible electorate and 79% of the registered electorate.

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² Stephen Ansolabehere and Charles H. Stewart III, "Residual Votes Attributable to Voting Technology," *Journal of Politics* 2005.

Each of these figures is an estimate, with the voting-aged population being perhaps the most accurate. A comment is in order about each. The Census estimates the voting aged population using the last decennial census and annual data on population changes. Researchers, such as Professor Michael McDonald, estimate the eligible electorate using information on citizenship from the Current Population survey and on felons to project the eligible population.³ The Census itself makes a projection of the eligible electorate based on the CPS.

Voter registration is perhaps the most difficult figure to gauge. Secretaries of State and state election boards report total registration and other statistics in their annual reports and press releases. Voter registration from the state reports totaled 172 million in 2004⁴ and approximately 187 million in 2008.⁵ These figures overestimate the number of registered voters, as there are obsolete and duplicate listings on official lists. Registration lists can become obsolete quickly because many people move and fail to update their registration information. When it created the Qualified Voter File, the state of Michigan estimated that one-in-eight of the names on the lists were no longer valid. Audits conducted in Los Angeles County put the figure between 5 and 10 percent in that county. States and counties do have procedures for updating rolls, but it is difficult and expensive to keep the lists current.

A second estimate of the number actually registered comes from the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey. Using the CPS Election Supplement, the Census

³ See, for example, Michael McDonald and Samuel Popkin, "The Myth of the Vanishing Voter," *American Political Science Review* 95 (2001).

⁴ Figures reported by the Election Assistance Commission. See, for instance Table 4 in the EAC report The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of Elections for Federal Office, 2003-2004. June 30, 2005. http://www.eac.gov/clearinghouse/docs/reports-and-surveys-nvra-2004-survey-table4/attachment_download/file

⁵ NASS Survey: State Voter Registration Figures for the 2008 General Election, November 3, 2008.

projects that 142 million people were registered in 2004, rather than the 172 million reported on the rolls. The 142 million figure suggests that the number of duplicates and obsolete entries on registration lists is approximately 17 percent (=30/172). The 2008 CPS is not yet available, but estimates based on other surveys project that there are 168 million registered voters in 2008. Throughout the discussion below, I will use the 168 million figure as the estimate of registered persons. Using the much higher 187 million person figure will change estimates, but in a way that increases the estimated number of people who could not vote because of registration difficulties. Clearly, more extensive and accurate information on registration is needed.

The final component above is total turnout consists of the total number of people who went to the polls or sent in absentee ballots in the 39 states that report total numbers of voters in their states' certification of the votes; 11 states still do not report total numbers of voters. Total votes cast reflects the total votes in those states where that is reported plus the votes for the office that received the most ballots in states that do not certify total voters. The incompleteness in vote reports and potential errors in voter registration lists make these the least precisely estimated of these figures. Although these figures are somewhat imperfect, they are still very revealing about the place that registration holds in the voting process.

Approximately 44 million eligible Americans were not registered in 2008 and therefore could not vote in the general election. Another 35 million registered voters did not vote. There are a variety of reasons for non-participation. Through the Current Population Survey and the Cooperative Congressional Election Study we may gauge how

many people were unable to register or to vote because of administrative difficulties related to registration and the voter authentication process.

Voter Registration in the Electoral Process

One may think of election administration as a system with three key components – voter authentication, vote preparation, and vote management (including tabulation).

Vote management includes securing votes and maintaining their privacy, tabulation, and certification of results. Vote preparation involves the individual recording his or her preferences, and consists largely of ballot design and the act of voting. Voter authentication is the process through which election officials verify that the individual is indeed eligible to vote, has not already voted in the given election, and is given the correct ballot on which to record vote preferences.

The essential function of voter registration today is authentication. Voter registration consists of a list, maintained and managed by the election office of all eligible people (non-felon citizens over 18) who have filed valid registration applications. The election office uses that list to assign people a ballot-form and precinct. It is used to check the individual in at the polling place or when a request for absentee ballot is received, and it is used to block others from voting in the person's stead or the person from voting more than once or in the wrong set of offices.

There are other key parts of the authentication process, especially the actions of poll workers on Election Day and voter identification requirements. It is the responsibility of poll workers to verify that the voter is who he or she claims to be and

has not already voted. State laws determine what sorts of information the poll worker may use to authenticate voters, ranging from simply stating one's name and address, as in Massachusetts, to requiring that all voters present government-issued photographic identification.⁶

Development and maintenance of the registration system is a challenging task. The registration system has many points of entry, as people may file applications through a variety of avenues. According to figures compiled by the Census in the Current Population Survey in 2004, the most common means of registration are at the local election office (24%), at the registry of motor vehicles (19%), through the mail (12%), at the polls on Election Day (6%), and at schools (6%).⁷ The local election office receives all registration applications and verifies them. The town or county office then compiles the list of all registrants and uses this information to construct precincts, plan inform people of elections, and authenticate voters at the polls on Election Day or who request absentee or early ballots.

The system was not designed on a fresh slate to meet the needs of authentication. Rather it evolved out of 19th century mechanisms for party building. Lists were originally developed and maintained by the parties in cities like New York and Boston so that parties could determine who were their supporters, and could challenge the eligibility of others. Over the course of the 19th and 20th Centuries towns and counties assumed the responsibility for voter registration. This development occurred piecemeal, and many

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⁶ For more on this see Stephen Ansolabehere and Nathaniel Persily, "Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder," *Harvard Law Review* 121 (2008): 1737.

⁷ Another 6 percent said "some other place or way"; 1 percent registered at public assistance offices; and 16 percent did not answer the question. Kelly Holder, "Voting and Registration in the 2004 Election," *Current Population Report*, P20-556, March 2005, http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p20-556.pdf.

areas, especially rural counties, did not rely on voter lists until quite recently. For example, New York required registration in all counties in 1965; Minnesota, in 1973, and Ohio, in 1978. Today, voter registration is required in every county in 49 states, North Dakota being the exception.

Even though nearly universally used, voter registration varies considerably across states and counties in its implementation. Every state adheres to its own laws defining registration requirements, and county and town offices have developed their own routines for managing and deploying the lists. Variation in the administrative capacity of the counties is particularly important in this regard. Most urban and suburban counties have professional, full-time election administration, while many rural counties and towns have part-time election administration and very small budgets.

Maintenance of voter lists is one of the biggest responsibilities and challenges of local election offices. According to Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project's survey of election office budgets in the United States, approximately one-third of the local office budges are devoted to the registration lists. There are a variety of problems in keeping the lists current, especially the mobility of voters and the failure of many people to inform the office of changes of address and the difficulties checking information on the voter files against other databases, such as drivers' licenses. Before the Help America Vote Act registration files were typically paper-based systems, making the clerical tasks even more tedious. The lack of computerization was especially common in rural areas, where local election officers have other full-time responsibilities. The Help America

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⁸ Stephen Ansolabehere and David Konisky, "The Introduction of Voter Turnout and Its Effect on Turnout," *Political Analysis* 14(2006): 83-100.

⁹ Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, "Voting: What Is, What Could Be," July 1, 2001.

Vote Act provided incentives to states to create statewide voter registration lists by 2006 as a way to improve the technology used to manage the lists, especially in rural counties.

It should be stressed that the local election offices put considerable effort and resources into the maintenance of their lists. The administrative staff verify the validity of registration applications, carry out the clerical tasks associated with creating and updating lists, identify names that ought to be removed from the rolls in accordance with state and federal laws (though sometimes private firms do this), prepare the lists for use on Election Day, and collect the information from the lists used at polling places, such as total number of people voting. They also keep track of vote histories of individuals, which are used to flag registrants on the list who are active and those who are inactive, in accordance with NVRA.

Like any large complicated data system, voter registration lists have errors or are used incorrectly. People may fill out their registration forms incorrectly or incompletely, making them ineligible to vote even though they have filed an application. Clerical errors may record the incorrect name, address, birth year, or party. Administrators may misplace registration applications. Poll workers may check off the wrong person as having voted or forget to record that someone voted. There may also be attempts at fraudulent registrations, such as registering in multiple jurisdictions or voting for someone else. Perhaps the most obvious and observable problems trace to the mobility of the society. People move and often fail to notify the election office of a change in their status.

Types of errors in rolls may be classified as False Positives and False Negatives.

False positives correspond to names that should not be on the rolls but are. This is

inevitable because of population mobility. Studies of jury lists and drivers' license lists find as much as 20 percent of the names on these data bases are no longer valid, either because the person moved or died. There has been little systematic study of duplications or invalid entries on voter lists. Through the Pew Foundation, my colleague Alan Gerber at Yale and I are conducting a pilot study in California and Connecticut. Our analysis of Los Angeles County finds that approximately 6 percent of the entries on the voter files are no longer valid because the person is no longer at the address. We are currently documenting other sorts of errors as well, such as discrepancies in addresses, names, and party registrations.

False positives have been of greatest concern when questions of fraud arise, as it is commonly thought that voters might impersonate someone on the list who is no longer a valid registrant. I have encountered no such instances in my own research. A further problem with duplicate applications and registrations emerges from the increasing difficulty managing the lists, especially in large counties.

False negatives are a second type of error; these occur because names are not on the rolls but should be or are incorrectly recorded by the election office. Such errors arise from a wide variety of causes, such as clerical errors, illegible forms, misplaced or undelivered applications. The volume of new registrants toward the end of the general election can tax local election office staff and lead to errors.

False negatives have become controversial when they allegedly result from improper purges. NVRA attempted to regulate the rules of purges and make them more standard across states. The difficulty for the county office is when to decide when an

entry on the list is no longer valid and should be dropped, and when the entry represents a person who is still at the address and might show up at the polls on Election Day.

In addition to errors that include names that ought not be on the rolls and exclude those that ought to be, there are barriers to registration that make it difficult to register in the first place. The NVRA and state laws have sought to make registration easier and more accessible.

Voters Experiences in 2008

The Current Population Survey (CPS) provides an important resource for studying the electoral experience in the nation. The CPS is a much larger scale survey than most other studies, which allows researchers to measurement of relatively low frequency events. In addition, the Election Supplement of the CPS consists of a questionnaire tailored to measuring the size of the electorate and the reasons for not voting.

Building on the CPS, the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) in 2006 and 2008 developed extensive instrumentation to measure registration, voting, and a variety of difficulties voting and barriers to participation. The study asked in the pre-election survey and in the post election survey whether the respondent is registered. The survey's vote question distinguished among those who simply did not vote, those who definitely voted, those who thought about it and those who usually vote, and those who tried to vote but were not allowed ("did not or could not"). The CCES samples exceed 30,000 respondents, allowing for fairly precise measurement of even relatively rare

events, and the questionnaire ascertained particular election experiences, including many not asked in the CPS.

Using the survey data, we may gauge the magnitude of the problems that voters encountered when trying to vote. Specifically, we may estimate the number who attempted to vote but could not or did not. Of CCES respondents who reported being registered, 86 percent reported that they voted (compared with a projected 79 percent in the population), and 11 percent reported that they did not attempt to vote. The remaining 3 percent reported that they "attempted to vote but could not or did not." Three percent of all registered voters translates into 4 to 5 million registered voters who attempted to vote but could not.¹⁰

Why don't people register and vote? Extensive research on voting behavior has documented that most of the reasons for not registering and not voting are sociological and political, such as dislike of the candidates or general antipathy toward politics. But, administrative difficulties have also been found to keep people out of the political system.¹¹

Consider first reasons for non-registration. According to the 2004 CPS, half of all non-registrants cited their lack of interest in politics (46.6%) or that their vote doesn't matter (3.4%) as the reason for not registering. One fifth of the respondents cited administrative issues – deadlines (17%) and residency (4%). Those two administrative

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¹⁰ According to the survey, 2.7 percent of the 168 million registered voters reported that they attempted to vote but could not. With 24,046 respondents who reported registration and answered the vote question, the margin of error on the proportion .027 is .002. That projects to a 95-percent confidence interval on the estimated number of registered non-voters who attempted to vote ranging from 4.2 to 4.9 million. The CPS does not ask whether someone attempted to vote.

¹¹ The classic work in this line of research is Raymond Wolfinger and Steven Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* Yale, 1980.

factors combined account for approximately 9 million people nationwide failing to register in 2004. Again, these figures should be compared with the 2008 data when they become available, but I have little reason to expect a marked change as deadlines and residency requirements have not changed much since 2004. Assuming these administrative barriers have the same effect in 2008, then 11 million people will have failed to register because of deadlines and changes in residency.

The next step is the decision of registered people to vote. A variety of problems in voter authentication can prevent those who try to vote from participation or can deter those who would like to vote from attempting to do so. Such problems take many forms, including failure to receive absentee ballots, disallowed from voting at the polls, lack of appropriate identification, and not actually being registered or registered correctly.

The CCES data are instructive of the reasons for non-voting among registered voters during the 2008 election. The CCES asked people whether they are registered and also whether they voted, attempted to vote, or did not vote (and did not try). The survey then asks non-voters why they did not participate and voters about their experiences at the polls. Table 1 presents the reasons for not voting among Registered Non-Voters in the 2008 CCES. The first column isolates those people who reported being registered but did not try to vote, which is revealing about the first stage of the process. The second column isolates those who tried to vote but failed, which is the second stage of the process. The third column corresponds to the sample as a whole.

Overall, 82 percent of registered non-voters cited a reason not connected in anyway to administration, especially dislike of the candidates. The remainder cited a range of administrative problems: 2 percent of all registered non-voters said they lacked

appropriate identification, 5 percent said they were not in fact registered, 4 percent said the lines were too long, 2 percent said they were disallowed at the polls, 4 percent said that they requested but did not receive absentee ballots, and 2 percent did not know where to vote. All told, 17 percent of the 44 million registered, eligible voters who did not turn out in 2008 stated that they did not vote for administrative reasons.

The survey reveals that the authentication process and registration create barriers four ways -- lack of ID, not registered, failure to receive an absentee, and disallowed at the polls. These parallel the reasons for non-voting measured by the CPS in 2000 and 2004, with the addition of the ID category. All four combined were cited by 13 percent of registered non-voters as the reason for not participating in the 2008 general election. This implies that 4 million (without the ID category) to 5 million (with the ID category) registered voters could not vote because of problems with registration or authentication or getting an absentee ballot. That figure is higher than estimates from the CPS in 2000; at the very least it appears that the problems arising from voter authentication are not appreciably smaller than eight years ago.

It is worth distinguishing further those who tried to vote and those who did not, as their experiences and reasons for not voting differ in important ways.

Of registered non-voters who attempted but failed to vote, 38 percent cited some form of administrative failure, including lines, ID, polling place location, absentee ballots, registration, and being disallowed at polls. The remaining 62 percent cited reasons such as being out of town, being sick or disabled, or not being interested in the election. Two-fifths, then, of the 2.7 percent who attempted to vote but failed equals 1

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 $^{^{12}}$ The CPS includes getting an absentee ballot and registration problem in the same category.

percent of all eligible voters, which projects to 2 million people who attempted to vote but failed because of administrative problems.¹³

The CCES further point to specific problems with absentee voting that need to be addressed and with lingering questions of access for disabled and sick people. Table 1 presents the reasons for non-voting among registered non-voters who attempted to vote and those who did not attempt to vote. Of those who tried to vote the three most common reasons for non-voting are Sick or Disabled (19.6%), Out of Town (15.1%), and Requested but Did Not Receive Absentee Ballot (13.6%). Of those who did not try to vote, the most common reasons were Not Liking the Candidates (28.8%), Sick or Disabled (11.4%), and Out of Town (9.1%).

The difficulties with absentee voting are notable because of the steady growth of absentee voting over the past three decades. Absentee votes cast in presidential elections have grown from 5 percent of ballots cast in 1972 to 25 percent of ballots cast in 2008. Reliance on voting by mail or absentee is especially pronounced in the West, where approximately half of all votes came through the mails.

Taking these data literally, the reported problems suggest that actual denial of the vote at the polling places is rare. Eight percent of those who attempted to vote but could not said that they "attempted to vote at the polls but were not allowed." That works out to about 300,000 people out of 133 million voters nationwide. Another 4 percent of registered non-voters who tried to vote, or 150,000 people, said they couldn't vote for lack of ID, and 14 percent of those who tried but failed to vote requested but did not receive an absentee ballot. All three categories total slightly more than 1 million people.

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¹³ The CPS does not clearly distinguish intentions to vote and it does not clearly distinguish different sorts of problems.

An alternative way to gauge problems encountered at the polling place is to ask directly whether people attempted to vote and encountered problems in the voter authentication process. Again the answer is that these problems affected about 1 percent of eligible voters, or about 2 million people.

The survey asked respondents who voted or attempted to vote whether they encountered problems with their voter registrations or were asked to show photographic identification. Half of all voters (55%) were asked to show identification, while a small fraction (3.8%) of all voters reported problems with their registrations. Of those asked to show identification and of those who reported registration problems, the survey followed up with a question asking whether the respondent was allowed to vote.

Those with registration problems, which account for just under 4% of those who tried to vote. Half of these voters were allowed to vote a regular ballot and another quarter voted a provisional ballot. However, one-fourth of those with registration problems (1 percent of the voters) reported that they were not allowed to vote. Add to that another set of people who experienced problems with voter identification. Of the half of all voters asked to show voter identification, 3.4 percent said that they then voted provisional ballots and 1.2 percent said that they were not allowed to vote at all.

Registration problems and exclusions due to voter identification overlap considerably. Eighty-four percent of those not allowed to vote because of a registration problem were asked for identification. Hence, the exclusions due to authentication (identification or registration) problems comes to just over 1 percent of the electorate, which is slightly lower than the figure implied by the percent of non-voters who cited registration and other authentication problems as the reason for not voting.

Administrative failures, then, appear to have prevented approximately 2 to 3 million people who tried to vote from actually voting in 2008.

Finally, we turn to those who did not attempt to vote at all. Election administration may also affect participation by discouraging voters. Potential voters may view the hassles of registration, obtaining a ballot, or waiting in line as sufficient reason for not voting. Table 1 is instructive about these issues as well. Approximately 12.7 percent of registered, eligible voters chose not to vote in 2008. The second column of Table 1 suggests that the lion's share of these respondents cited non-administrative reasons: 14.4% identified registration, ID, lines, access to polls, and absentee ballots as reasons for not voting in 2008, and 85.6% had some other reason. Excluding people who admitted that they were not registered those who stated administrative reasons for non-participation shrink further, to less than 10 percent. So an additional 1 to 2% of the eligible electorate might have chosen not to vote because of the prospect of administrative hassles, such as long lines, voter identification, difficulty getting an absentee ballot and the like. That figure translates into that another 2 to 4 million people stayed from the election away because of the hassle or the prospective administrative problems. This is a much more subjective number as these are people who stated an administrative reason even though they did not have that particular experience during the election.

Overall, 4 to 7 million registered voters were prevented or discouraged from voting by the administrative process of elections.

Summary

Research on the performance of the election systems during the 2008 election indicates that there were

- 79 million people eligible to vote who did not,
- 2 to 3 million voters *prevented* from voting because of registration or other authentication problems,
- 2 to 4 million discouraged from voting because of administrative problems, and
- 9 million not registered because of residency rules or registration deadlines.

These problems are of the same magnitude as observed in previous elections. There remain important weaknesses in the reporting of election data in the United States, including total numbers of registered voters and total numbers of voters in every state. Registration continues to create significant barriers to getting into the electoral system and to voting on Election Day. There is evidence of emerging problems, as well. Most notably, there appears to be an uptick in the numbers of people having difficulty obtaining absentee ballots, a problem usually associated with registration and authentication procedures.

Table 1. Reasons for Non-Voting, Registered Non-Voters, 2008 CCES

Reason	Did Not	Tried	
	Try	to Vote	All
I forgot	1.8%	0.2%	1.5%
Not interested	5.2	0.0	4.3
Too busy	6.0	5.1	5.9
Not Like Cands.	28.8	2.3	23.1
Not registered	5.2	2.7	4.6
Lack ID	1.5	3.9	2.0
Out of town	9.1	15.1	10.4
Sick/disabled	11.4	19.6	13.2
Transportation	2.1	2.9	2.3
Bad weather	0.9	0.5	0.8
Long line at polls	3.0	8.1	4.0
Not allowed at Polls	1.0	8.2	2.4
Request, Not receive			
Absentee Ballot	2.1	13.6	4.3
Not Know Where	1.6	3.1	1.8
Not Know Enough	5.1	2.0	4.3
Other	13.0	12.8	13.0
Don't Know	2.3	0.0	2.0

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